







Under Which Conditions Did the Greeks 
“Believe” in Their Myths?
The Religious Criteria of  Adherence
vinciane pirenne-delforge
In 1987, Fritz Graf  published a book entitled Griechische Mythologie. Eine Ein-
führung, which was soon translated into English under the same title: Greek 
Mytholog y. An Introduction  1. This work was immediately evaluated as “the best 
historical survey” on the subject and this is still the case today 2. Besides this 
essay, a large amount of  work has been published by Fritz Graf, demonstrat-
ing a wide range of  interests and impressive expertise. As his main concerns 
have always been Greek myth and religion, I would like to connect both of  
these themes in this modest contribution 3, in order to thank our colleague 
and friend for his revealing and always inspiring work.
Such an ambition may seem adventurous as neither “myth” nor “reli-
gion” has been spared by the post-modern and critical dismantling of  many 
interpretive categories or dichotomies such as muthos vs. logos. We must un-
derline once more that “myth” and “religion” are not concepts native to 
the Greek language and do not have to be used as frameworks of  thought 4. 
However, the splitting-up of  these categories as “ideal types” does not lessen 
the need to understand the narratives that we call “myths” and the Greeks 
called logoi or muthoi. We must also address their connection with what we 
call “religion”, which fi ts in with various Greek expressions such as tà hierá 
(“sacred things”), tà theîa (“that which refers to the gods”), tà nómima (“that 
which is prescribed and refers to tradition”) 5. A pragmatic defi nition of  
1 Graf  (1987) and (1993).
2 Bremmer (1994) 65 n. 4. Very recently, this was still the opinion of  Calame (2007) 
282.
3 This paper is the English adaptation of  an analysis in French included in a book on 
Pausanias. See Pirenne-Delforge (2008) 64–85.
4 See, in particular, Detienne (1981), Calame (1991) and (1996) 9–55, esp. 46.
5 On the defi nition of  “myth”, see Des Bouvrie (2002) 11–69. On the different Greek 
words referring to “religion”, see Rudhardt (²1992) 11–17, and (2008). 
Chr. Walde, U. Dill (éds), Antike Mythen. Medien, Transformationen, Konstruktionen. 
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Greek “myth” might describe it as a narrative rooted into the knowledge 
shared by a society, i. e. a traditional story referring to the representation 
of  the past shared by this specifi c human community and to the represen-
tation of  the gods and the world framing its current life 6. Such narratives 
are transformed during oral performance or written composition but these 
variations are not aleatory. They are restricted within certain limits and such 
a capacity for adaptability is a measure of  their vitality. 
What has for a long time been interpreted as a gradual transition from 
muthos to logos and as the Greek move towards enlightenment has been largely 
questioned for at least two decades 7. In fact, the expressive power of  “myth” 
and its capacity to illustrate the truth in one way or another survived the 
early Classical period, when its cultural and religious relevance began to 
be called into question. Furthermore, “mythical” narratives seem to have 
incited critical debate as early as their fi rst appearance in our Greek literary 
heritage. The proem of  Hesiod’s Theogony is a beautiful example of  such a 
potentiality, with a contrasted speech attributed to the Muses.
Two verses spoken by the goddesses and directed to the “shepherds 
that camp in the wild, disgraces, merest bellies” 8 provide a contrast to fi c-
tions, ψεύδεα (some would say “lies”) “that sound like realities”, i. e. “plau-
sible fi ctions”, on the one hand, and “truths”, ἀληθέα, on the other 9. Both 
propositions are endorsed by the Muses, who underline their own capacity 
to perform the fi rst as well as the second kind of  address according to their 
own good will 10. Fictions as well as truths are connected with divine inspi-
   6 Cf. Graf  (1993) 1–8. Even if  “myth transcends the text” (2), narratives are our best 
tool for grasping myths.
   7 See for example the critical essays gathered in Buxton (1999), among which we fi nd 
Fritz Graf ’s article entitled “Mythical Production: Aspects of  Myth and Technology 
in Antiquity”.
   8 Hes. theog. 26, transl. West (1988) 3.
   9 Hes. theog. 27 f.: ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα | ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν 
 ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. These lines have been much discussed. For example, fi ve 
papers were presented on this issue during a conference held in Lille and entitled 
“Hésiode et le métier du mythe”: Judet de La Combe/Blaise/Rousseau (1996). My 
own refl ection owes much to the article published by Jean Rudhardt in this book. 
See also Daix (2006), Pucci (2007) 60–70, and Heiden (2007), whose work is briefl y 
discussed in the following note.
10 The expression “lies that resemble truth” from verse 27, is generally thought to refer 
to polemic against a rival poetry. Such a common opinion was recently addressed 
by Bruce Heiden arguing that homoios does not mean “resemblance so close as to 
be deceptive” but “the same with respect to a certain quality”: Heiden (2007), with 
previous bibliography. Following a suggestion made by Marie-Christine Leclerc in 
1993, the author aims at demonstrating that the Hesiodic Muses claim to tell only 
the truth because their lies were somehow equivalent to truth. So far so good. In 








40 Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge 
ration and refer to what we call “mythical” narratives, which are, as early 
as the Hesiodic poetry, themselves related to critical assessment. Different 
levels of  “truth” are connected with the goddesses themselves. The poet’s 
own position in these matters certainly consists of  claiming a higher degree 
of  truthfulness for the inspiration poured onto his own lips by the Muses 11. 
“Mythical” narratives therefore constitute a group of  tales in which both 
plausible fi ction and truth may potentially be present, unless truth strays far 
from the standards of  plausibility. I shall return to this point.
Criticism of  myths must not merely be seen as a peculiar stage of  the 
reading of  traditional tales, as has been thought for a long time. This critical 
posture is deeply embedded in the system and is a fundamental part of  it 
since rivalry seems to be present as early as Hesiod’s poetry. Hence our dif-
fi culty in grasping this and accounting for such a rich and multiform whole. 
Quoting Geoffrey Lloyd, I might say that some puzzling statements “have, 
no doubt, to be understood, in each case, against a background of  a rich 
and complex set of  beliefs, that are gradually acquired by the members of  
the society concerned, a set that contains more and less central, more and 
less secure, items, some open to doubt, others requiring specialist or learned 
interpretation, and yet others passing as unquestioned or axiomatic” 12. Dis-
tinguishing one context of  discourse 13 from another is necessary for defi n-
ing to what degree statements may be left undisputed or, on the other hand, 
open to challenge.
In the Hesiodic account of  the poet’s encounter with the Muses at 
the foot of  Mount Helicon, truths are related to emphatic and authorita-
tive statements (γερύεσθαι), which need not necessarily require likelihood, 
while fi ctions seem to be more closely connected with reality and are plau-
sible. These two verses entail some notions that will become fundamental 
tools in the ancient and modern refl ection about Greek myths: truth, fi ction, 
likelihood. Many authors, at each stage of  the long-standing Greek cultural 
life, might be taken into account in order to illustrate the coexistence of  
these notions as far as “myths” are concerned. Skipping centuries, I choose 
though the philological analysis of  homoios is highly convincing. Following Chan-
traine s. v. ψεύδομαι, and Leclerc (1993) 71 f.; 216–218, I choose for my part to 
understand pseudea as “fi ctions”. Since the word etuma points to “sensible realities” 
and not “truth” as alethea may do, we recapture an understandable opposition be-
tween “plausible fi ctions” and “truth”, i. e. lifelikeness on the one hand, and truth 
on the other, even though such a truth – alethea – does not necessarily fi t in with 
reality. From this perspective, the Muses do not tell deceptive lies but their inspira-
tion points to several levels of  “truth”. See also Daix (2006).
11 Graf  (1993) 79: “Hesiod claims to hear the truth in person.”
12 Lloyd (1990) 27.
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Pausanias and his journey into the cultural landscape of  Roman Greece in 
order to decipher some of  the criteria he used to express his adherence 
to mythical narratives. This is not mere chance as Paul Veyne, in his short 
book Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?, quoted a range of  examples from 
Pausanias’ work 14.
One of  these examples comes from the beginning of  the eighth book 
of  Pausanias’ Periegesis, where he displays the genealogical succession of  the 
Arcadian kings. Pelasgus was the fi rst king who ruled over the region and 
he civilized its inhabitants. Lycaon, the next king, was even wiser than his 
father in his actions but, in matters of  religion, his choices were less judicious. 
He sacrifi ced a new-born child to the Zeus he had called Lycaeus, while 
his contemporary Cecrops offered cakes to Zeus Hypatos on the acropolis 
of  Athens. After the sacrifi ce, Lycaon was immediately turned into a wolf  
(8.2.1–3). At this point, Pausanias interrupts the story in order to assess this 
statement (8.2.4): 
For my own part, I believe the tale (καὶ ἐμέ γε ὁ λόγος οὗτος πείθει), which has 
been handed down among the Arcadians from ancient times (ἐκ παλαιοῦ), and 
has likelihood (τὸ εἰκός) in its favour. For the men of  that time, because of  their 
righteousness and piety (ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης καὶ εὐσεβείας), were guests of  the gods, 
and sat with them at table. […] Men were raised to the rank of  gods in those days, 
and are worshipped down to the present time 15.
However, times have changed. Pausanias denounces the sin of  his own 
age, on the one hand, and the human capacity of  building falsehood upon 
truths (οἱ τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἐψευσμένα), on the other (8.2.5 f.). 
People delighted by marvellous stories (ὁπόσοι δὲ μυθολογήμασιν ἀκούοντες 
ἥδονται), such as Tritons speaking with a human voice or stones shed-
ding tears, have corrupted truthful issues by mixing them with fi ctions (τοῖς 
 ἀληθέσιν ἐλυμήναντο, συγκεραννύντες αὐτὰ ἐψευσμένοις, 8.2.7).
In this passage, Pausanias makes a strong distinction between a meta-
morphosis into a wolf  supported by ancestral tradition, hence rooted in 
times of  piety, and the same phenomenon connected with more recent 
times, which therefore becomes incredible fantasy (μυθολόγημα). The tra-
ditional Arcadian discourse is believable insofar as the quality of  the period 
to which it refers may be placed high on a moral and religious level, even 
though metamorphosis is an issue normally open to challenge by Pausanias 16. 
Deciphering his expressions of  belief  implies an understanding of  the dis-
tinction he draws between different kinds of  tale. On the one hand, we fi nd 
muthologemata, conceived as marvellous tales involving heroic achievements 
14 Veyne (1988; French original 1983). Cf. Buxton (1994) 155–158.
15 On the issue of  “gods born of  human beings”, see Pirenne-Delforge (2009 forth-
coming).








42 Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge 
and fantastic bestiary. On the other, there are credible stories, which are not 
necessarily plausible in their materiality (metamorphosis sounds strange in 
this respect) but are supported by specifi c arguments. 
Another passage further in the same book authorizes such a qualifi ca-
tion and sheds light on its implications. Pausanias has just told the Arcadian 
version of  the story of  Cronus swallowing his own children: Zeus was sup-
posed to have escaped from his father’s voracity but so was Poseidon, since 
Rhea fi rst gave her husband a horse instead of  the new-born god, just as she 
did afterwards, substituting a stone for Zeus 17. Whereas he often maintains 
a silence about such local stories, which he meticulously reports without a 
commentary 18, Pausanias interrupts his discourse once more to comment 
on this Arcadian tale. The passage is well-known and has been much com-
mented upon 19: 
When I began to write my synthesis, I was inclined to count these Greek stories 
(τούτοις Ἑλλήνων […] τοῖς λόγοις) as foolishness (εὐηθίας), but on getting as far as 
Arcadia I grew to hold a more thoughtful view of  them, which is this. In the days of  
old, those Greeks who were considered wise spoke their sayings not straight out but 
in riddles (δι’ αἰνιγμάτων), and so the stories about Cronus I conjectured to be one 
sort of  Greek wisdom. In matters of  divinity, therefore, I shall adopt the received 
tradition (τῶν μὲν δὴ ἐς τὸ θεῖον <ἀν>ἡκόντων τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρησόμεθα) 20. 
This passage is a welcome addition to Pausanias’ previous statement about 
muthologemata, a word which does not appear here 21. In fact, “these Greek 
logoi ”, thought to be foolish before travelling the roads of  Arcadia, point to 
the well-defi ned category of  stories referring to gods. 
The swallowing of  one’s own children is a strange divine behaviour and 
this conception of  the gods had already been denounced by philosophers 
centuries earlier 22. Nevertheless, we may suspect such a behaviour to have 
been included among the Hesiodic alethea. In this respect, Pausanias gives 
evidence of  two ways of  addressing these stories: rejecting them as foolish-
nesses, on the one hand, and, on the other, respecting them as “riddles” to 
be carefully reported, since they were handed down by a tradition deeply 
rooted in a community. The register of  the enigmatic, which means hidden 
17 Paus. 8.8.2.
18 Pausanias echoes Herodotus’ statement that he must report tales without neces-
sarily believing them: Hdt. 7.152; cf. Paus. 6.3.8. See Pirenne-Delforge (2008) 26, 
30–32.
19 Oliver (1972); Veyne (1983) 106–110; Elsner (1992) 21; Habicht (²1998) 156 f.; Har-
tog (1996) 151–158; Jost, in Jost/Casevitz (1998) XXXIII–XXXVI; Hutton (2005) 
303–311; Pirenne-Delforge (2008) 71 f., 337–341. 
20 Paus. 8.8.2 f. (translation adapted from W. H. S. Jones).
21 On the rare occurrences of  this semantic fi eld in the Periegesis, see Pirenne-Delforge 
(2008) 82–86.








 Under Which Conditions Did the Greeks “Believe” in Their Myths? 43
discourse about the divine, implies a suspension of  judgement insofar as it 
is anchored in a remote past, an age of  piety and respect. All the other tales 
are open to challenge, which implies the need to read them with a critical eye 
in order to identify truthful elements of  the Greek past, which have been 
saturated by marvellous and incredible concretions. These other tales refer 
to human actions including the heroic sphere. 
The ten books written by Pausanias are full of  interesting places where 
he discusses stories. Sometimes foolishness is denounced. For example, how 
might we suppose that the inhabitants of  Troy had been deceived by a 
wooden horse? Everyone must be aware that Epeus constructed an engine 
for breaking down the wall 23. The reality of  the Trojan War is left undis-
puted as such but the details must be corrected. In the same vein, at Sparta, 
a statue dedicated to Aphrodite by Tyndareus represented the goddess as 
having fetters on her feet. One of  the aetiologies explained this particularity 
by referring to Tyndareus’ will to punish Aphrodite because she was at the 
origin of  his daughters’ shame 24. The historicity of  this consecration is not 
put into doubt but the validity of  the aetiology is contested. At Olympia, 
Pausanias describes a tablet recording the victories of  the Spartan Chio-
nis and considers as very simple those who believe that Chionis himself  
dedicated the tablet since one of  the recorded races had not yet been intro-
duced when Chionis was alive. Pausanias’ framework for evaluation is the 
same whatever period he is dealing with: he wants to provide a trustworthy 
report but plausibility may be the only achievement of  his investigations. 
When investigation completely fails, he places different versions one beside 
the other without taking on any particular position. The account of  local 
traditions is sometimes associated with an interjection of  incredulity, which 
does not imply more commentary: “for people believing this” (ὅτῳ πιστά). 
Twice, the expression refers to the underworld 25 and three passages refer to 
the marvellous capacities of  things or heroes 26. At Thebes, Pausanias uses a 
signifi cant expression, which might be a commentary on his own position in 
such matters. He is visiting the agora of  the city and he says: “The Greeks 
who believe that the Muses sang at the wedding of  Harmonia can point to 
the place in the market-place where they say the goddesses sang.” 27 What-
ever its credibility, the story is closely connected with a defi nite place and 
the autopsy of  such places is an essential component of  Pausanias’ journey. 
23 Paus. 1.23.8.
24 Paus. 3.15.11.
25 Paus. 2.5.1; 2.31.2.
26 Paus. 2.31.10; 4.2.7; 9.10.1.
27 Paus. 9.12.3 (transl. J. G. Frazer): Ἑλλήνων δὲ τοῖς ἀποδεχομένοις ᾆσαι Μούσας 
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Since the visitor fi rstly aimed at preserving the Greek heritage in all its local 
and particular components, critical assessment only remained an option and 
was not obligatory. Such narratives left undisputed were nevertheless virtu-
ally open to challenge. This was one option among others. The very limit 
of  Pausanias’ critical approach was defi ned by what he called to theion in one 
of  the passages of  book eight quoted above: “In matters of  divinity, I shall 
adopt the received tradition.”
Accordingly, we may point out three possibilities in Pausanias’ frame-
work for evaluation, when he opts for discussion:
 – narratives involving heroes, thought to be actors of  the Greek past, 
are open to critical assessment, regarding genealogical and narrative 
cohesion;
 – narratives involving heroes, who are more or less saturated with fantasy, 
are challenged;
 – narratives involving gods are seen as “riddles” to be left unquestioned.
Nevertheless, things are not that simple. There are intersections between 
these three kinds of  tale. Narratives involving heroes may be stripped of  
their marvellous concretions in order to dig out a kernel of  truth. Further-
more, some parts of  the narratives are related to gods or traditional ritual 
acts and should be left undisputed for that reason. The second and third 
options are closer than we might suspect. This is the point I would like to 
address now.
My fi rst example comes from the fi rst book and is related to Pausanias’ 
visit to Megara, where he mentions a temple to Apollo and his sister Artemis 
that is said to have been built by Alcathous, son of  Pelops, after slaying the 
monstrous lion of  Cithaeron. The beast was ravaging the land and the king 
Megareus had promised that whoever should slay the lion would marry his 
daughter. A classical heroic challenge, indeed. Megareus had already lost 
two sons, one killed by the lion and the other by Theseus. Alcathous suc-
ceeded, got the girl and the throne, and consecrated the temple of  the twin 
deities as thanksgiving. So the tale goes, concludes Pausanias (1.41.3). We 
would have been left alone with this tale but Pausanias, as author, interferes 
in his text with a critical statement (1.41.4): “Though I wish to conform to 
the Megarian tradition, I am unable to do so on all points.” He must face 
a chronological and genealogical problem: since Theseus is a descendant 
of  Pelops, Theseus would not have killed the son of  Alcathous who was 
himself  a son of  Pelops. The Megarians are not reliable on this point but 
the very conclusion of  the whole argument is signifi cant (1.41.5): “As far 
as Alcathous and the lion are concerned, whether it was on Cithaeron or 
elsewhere that the killing took place, he built a temple to Artemis Agrotera 
and Apollo Agraeus; let it suffi ce to remember it (ἐς τοσόνδε ἔστω μνήμη).” 
This passage is very indicative of  the way in which Pausanias tackles the vari-
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supports of  memory 28. Even though heroic and genealogical narratives may 
be challenged and questioned, monuments related to cults contribute to 
the rooting of  the piety of  the present in a remote past. Alcathous’ pious 
consecration does not need to be called into question as such, only the ge-
nealogical manipulations need to be. Instead, the following example will be 
more expressive.
In the ninth book, which refers to Pausanias’ visits to Boeotia, the scep-
tre of  Chaeroneia is a curiosity all the more worth mentioning as this ob-
ject is the most honoured of  the gods by the inhabitants (9.40.11: θεῶν δὲ 
 μάλιστα Χαιρωνεῖς τιμῶσι τὸ σκῆπτρον). The expression used by Pausanias 
closely connects the honours paid to this object with the cult performed by 
other cities in honour of  their poliadic deity. The divine status of  the scep-
tre derives from its history. Homer says that Hephaestus made the sceptre 
for Zeus, Hermes received it from Zeus and gave it to Pelops, who left it to 
Atreus, Atreus to Thyestes. Agamemnon fi nally obtained it from Thyestes. 
The sceptre probably arrived in Phocis with Electra as intermediate, and 
was fi nally obtained by the inhabitants of  Chaeroneia, who called it Spear. 
It has no public temple, but is kept by its priest in a private house. Every 
day, all sorts of  offerings are displayed on the table by its side. The sceptre 
is worshipped as a god would be. Furthermore, Pausanias states that “there 
is something peculiarly divine (τι θειότερον) about this sceptre, [which] is 
most clearly shown by the fame it brings to its owner” (9.40.11), but he does 
not specify the nature of  such a fame. The visitor is faced with common 
cultic features, known elsewhere as trapezomata  29, related to something com-
pletely uncommon but tremendously ancient, full of  divine brightness and 
deeply rooted in a long-standing ritual performance. The peculiar status of  
the sceptre was closely connected with its divine origin, as Hephaestus was 
said to be its craftsman. Pausanias might have left this point unchallenged, 
since a divine power is said to be at work behind the main cult of  a local 
community. Instead, he argues extensively for the genuineness of  the sceptre, 
which is said to be the only piece of  art really worked by Hephaestus. Three 
other pieces of  work attributed to the divine craftsman are discussed and 
their authenticity denied. The argument deserves close attention.
The fi rst object is a bronze bowl kept in the temple of  Apollo at  Patara 
in Lycia. Telephus was said to have dedicated this work of  Hephaestus. Pau-
sanias dismisses the claim, as the Lycians apparently ignore the fact that the 
fi rst to melt bronze were two Samians who were living some generations 
after Telephus. The second item is the chest brought by Eurypylus from 
Troy, which is assumed to be kept by the Patreans. However, this piece is 
not exhibited for inspection at Patras. The third and last object is the famous 
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necklace given to Harmonia as a wedding present. It was identifi ed with a 
jewel conserved in the sanctuary of  Adonis and Aphrodite at Amathus on 
Cyprus. The necklace is made of  green stones fastened together with gold, 
while the Odyssey describes the necklace fi nally given to Eriphyle as being 
made of  gold, although Homer was not ignorant of  jewels composed of  dif-
ferent materials (9.41.1–5). Accordingly, as Pausanias concludes, likelihood 
(τὸ εἰκός) implies that the sceptre is the only work of  Hephaestus.
Firstly, Pausanias’ argument refers to two sources of  information:  poetic 
songs and human opinion transmitted from one generation to another 
(9.41.1: ἡ φήμη). The poetic songs are a good starting point, and they are all 
the more reliable as the poet is Homer himself. The opinions passed down 
are a weak source and are open to deformation. Therefore, each claim has 
to be assessed according to various criteria. The claim of  the Lycians regard-
ing the bronze bowl is unwarranted because of  the relative chronology of  
metallurgy, a surprising argument as far as a divine work is concerned 30. The 
chest of  Eurypylus cannot be dated with precision, as the Patreans do not 
have it on display. Pausanias’ scepticism is certainly based on his own visit 
to the city, where he extensively refers to the origin of  the chest and to its 
role in the history and the rituals of  the place. Due to the fact that the chest 
was carried outside Dionysus’ sanctuary on one night during the festival of  
the god, it was diffi cult for the visitor to be present at this moment 31. The 
necklace kept in Amathus cannot be Harmonia’s famous jewel because of  
a contradiction between its materiality and the Homeric description. Finally, 
Pausanias did not prove the authenticity of  the sceptre. He only denied 
the same quality to the other pieces of  work assumed to be the results of  
 Hephaestus’ skill. The “likelihood”, the eikos, related to the genuineness of  
the sceptre in his conclusion is not the logical consequence of  the argument. 
In fact, its support lies at another level of  Pausanias’ discourse, i. e. inside 
the daily honours paid to an object not only depending on the divine sphere 
but really taking on a divine status. The weight of  a long-standing ritual is a 
powerful criterion in favour of  the work’s authenticity. Likelihood does not 
result from an argument built on a strong historical assessment but from a 
qualitative evaluation deeply anchored in ritual performance.
 Accordingly, the antiquity of  a discourse is not necessarily an unequivo-
cal criterion. Let us take the example of  the marvellous tale narrated by 
the inhabitants of  Tanagra in Boeotia about a Triton. In the sanctuary of  
Dionysus, Pausanias saw such a fantastic beast and he took the opportu-
nity to describe this kind of  animal, which he had also seen in Rome, along 
30 The same argument is provided for refuting the attribution of  a dedication to 
 Ulysses (Paus. 8.14.7 f.). This is less intriguing in this case, as the episode is only 
related to the human world.
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with many other beasts he had never seen before. Two tales are narrated to 
explain why a Triton has been conserved in this sanctuary. The most vener-
able (ὁ μὲν δὴ σεμνότερος […] λόγος) tells how the Triton was overcome 
by the god prayed to by his female worshippers who were present on the 
sea-shore to be purifi ed before performing his orgia. The other story is not 
so extraordinary but is more plausible (πιθανώτερος δέ ἐστι). The Triton 
used to devastate the territory and carry off  all the cattle till the inhabitants 
set out a bowl of  wine for drinking. They fi nally caught the beast in this 
manner. They said that Dionysus had killed the Triton because he had been 
drunk (9.30.4 f.). Here we face the human ability to elaborate marvellous 
stories. On the other hand, as far as the sceptre is concerned, a venerable 
story is closely related to ritual. This is a strong distinction. In stories related 
to divine agency, the religious criterion of  adherence is all the more effi cient 
as the story is rooted into a ritual performance or a cult-place.
Narcissus’ story will be our last example, among many others that might 
have been chosen. Narcissus’ spring located in the district of  Thespiae is 
related to the death of  the young man, supposed to have fallen in love with 
his own refl ection. Pausanias does not subscribe to the story and provides 
another explanation. Narcissus had a twin sister, with whom he was in love. 
When the girl died, he found some comfort in looking at his own image 
refl ected in the waters of  the spring, imagining he was seeing his sister. But 
Narcissus is also the name of  a fl ower and Pausanias goes forward with this 
detail. He is persuaded that the fl ower grew many years before Narcissus 
the Thespian and was therefore independent of  him. The proof  is found 
in a poem of  Pamphus telling the tale of  Kore, the daughter of  Demeter, 
who was carried off  by Hades when she was gathering a marvellous narcis-
sus growing miraculously in order to deceive her. Since Pamphus is an old 
poet, born many years before Narcissus, this means that Narcissus did not 
give his name to the fl ower (9.31.7–9). There are three levels to the argu-
ment: fi rstly, the criterion of  likelihood is applied to the story of  Narcissus’ 
death, as a man of  good sense would not fall in love with himself; secondly, 
a chronological measure separates Narcissus the man from the fl ower of  the 
same name; thirdly, the tale of  Kore raped by Hades receives no comment, 
as it belongs to those traditions about the divine that are left unquestioned 
and unchallenged.
*
Did Pausanias believe in myths? In fact, such a question misses the point 
because it takes as a whole several types of  narrative that need to be distin-
guished: the mass of  heroic stories alleged to encompass the remote past of  
the communities, on the one hand, the tales related to deities, on the other, 
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the taste for marvellous tales have built upon both of  these sets of  stories 
 – this is the poetic fantasy – or have adapted some of  them to search of  
identity and legitimization – this is the misappropriated use of  genealogy. 
Between Hesiod and Pausanias, centuries passed and the relevance of  
such tales has been more and more called into question: leaving the world of  
poetic inspiration, narratives about the past have been submitted to different 
questions and new analytical frameworks, by those who wanted to search for 
things of  the past. Hecataeus’ laughter when faced with the silly stories of  
the Greeks was a fi rst step and the most radical option was taken by Thucy-
dides deciding to put aside all of  what he called muthodes, “mythic stuff ”, 
in his own work 32. Without addressing all these well-known developments, 
let us point out the fact that Pausanias is not as far away from the double 
statement of  the Hesiodic Muses as the chronological gap might lead us to 
suppose. What remains strongly is the religious dimension of  the aletheia as 
a true but enigmatic discourse about the divine world. On the other hand, 
one part of  the semantic fi eld of  aletheia seems to be alien to the inspired 
perspective of  Hesiod and is more closely connected with the critical as-
sessments of  Hecataeus: the credible story is what is left when fantasy and 
embellishments have been cut out. 
Pausanias’ work attests to complementary attitudes as far as truth is 
concerned. A fi rst level points out the hidden truth of  the cosmogonic and 
theogonic tales, for which the main reference is Hesiod and his authoritative 
statements. A second level concerns the narratives improved by a critical 
work that makes them credible, just as Hecataeus seemed to practise in the 
poorly preserved fragments of  his work. But the multiplicity of  local tradi-
tions often hinders such an improvement. Therefore, this third level points 
out Herodotus’ way of  addressing such traditions: he aims at setting down 
what is told, without necessarily believing it 33, a statement that is quoted 
almost exactly by Pausanias in the sixth book of  his work 34. 
Critical assessments are halted by the necessity of  setting down tradi-
tions as far as divine agency is concerned, on the one hand, and by the weight 
of  long-standing ritual performance at a local level, on the other. If  such a 
reserve is not a literary and intellectual posture inspired by the spirit of  the 
time, we must change the wording of  the question about Pausanias’ belief. 
We should not wonder whether Pausanias believed in myths but why he gave 
credence to some myths and not to others. 
The answer lies in the background of  the narratives and is closely re-
lated to the authority with which Pausanias credits them. Adhering to such 
a statement as “Cronus swallowed his own children” is not the fearsome 
32 Thuc. 1.21.1. See Graf  (1993) 122–124.
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consequence of  a defi cient rationality but the expression of  the trust placed 
in the traditional background to which such a proposition belongs. Fur-
thermore, both poetry and prophecy are closely connected with the register 
of  ainigmata from the earliest days, when gods were still inspiring elected 
human beings 35. The literal signifi cance of  a statement may be puzzling, but 
the source of  the knowledge that informs it is indisputable and adherence 
results from this confi dence.
Cognitive anthropology has shown that we can roughly divide the do-
main of  beliefs into two parts: intuitive beliefs on the one hand, which are 
connected with our approach to the natural world and therefore shared by 
various cultures, refl exive beliefs, on the other, which depart more or less 
seriously from our commonsense ideas. In this context of  “counterintuitive” 
beliefs, the source of  authority is an essential component 36. The adherence 
to a statement as diffi cult to understand as “Cronus swallowed his own chil-
dren” is possible in a group if  the authority that conveys it is strong enough. 
Such information belongs to the knowledge shared by the group and forms 
the culturally determined beliefs. If  authority fails to maintain its force, ad-
hesion will become weaker or disappear, but transmission will nevertheless 
go on through the centuries 37. 
Returning to Pausanias, we may build on this theoretical approach. Col-
lecting Greek traditions is the main purpose of  his work. The knowledge 
shared by a Greek community, even on a local level, belongs to what he calls 
panta ta Hellenika  38. However, inside this huge heritage, not all the narratives 
imply the same level of  adherence. This adherence is all the stronger as the 
tale is rooted in ancient poetic statements related to the representation of  the 
divine. It is effective too if  a ritual performance attests at the present time 
a long-standing veneration. In the 2nd century AD, poetic performance no 
longer provides authoritative statements, as the rhapsodes and choruses of  
earlier times might have done. Hence authoritative validation has to come 
from elsewhere, in particular from ritual performance, related to monuments 
of  the past. An example taken from Plato’s Phaedrus should make this point 
clear, by placing such a process as early as the Classical period. Socrates and 
Phaedrus are walking along the Ilissus River and discussing the tradition 
of  Oreithyia’s rape by Boreas. Socrates points out that the alleged loca-
tion of  this event is some furlongs farther down, where there is an altar to 
Boreas. Then, Phaedrus asks him if  he believes the tale (muthologema) is true. 
35 On this point, see a revealing statement by Pausanias: 10.12.11. On ainigmata, see 
Struck (2005).
36 See Boyer (1994); Sperber (1996) 97–102.
37 Sperber (1996) 133.
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 Socrates’ reply is in fact a charge against any rational interpretation of  such 
stories. He criticizes the “rustic sort of  wisdom” that tries to explain each 
tale in accordance with probability and concludes on the statement that he 
is more convinced by tradition (πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν) 
on these matters than by these pseudo-explanations without end 39. In this 
case, tradition is surely connected with the altar erected to Boreas in this 
place and with the honours paid to this god at the local level. This passage 
might be an echo of  what we fi nd in the eighth book of  Pausanias centuries 
later, when he forcefully states that, in matters of  divinity, he will adopt the 
received tradition.
In 1972, James Oliver noted that there was nothing different in the 
Arcadian tales to account for what he called Pausanias’ “conversion”, since 
Athenian logoi, for instance, were equally ancient and hence authoritative 40. 
He tried to demonstrate that the Panathenaic discourse of  Aelius Aristides 
could have infl uenced Pausanias when he was writing his Arcadian book, 
therefore producing a new awareness of  the value of  old stories. By con-
trast, Paul Veyne suggested that the experiencing of  Arcadia itself, with 
its remote traditions, engendered the visitor’s new respect for these logoi  41. 
Others related this experience to some philosophical interest in Stoic alle-
gorical interpretation 42. Veyne is surely correct in his statement that Arcadia 
itself  was a turning-point, even though we must be conscious that Pausanias’ 
self-presentation does not exactly refl ect some genuine experience, one that 
is rarely accessible, if  ever. Old Arcadian stories might have had an impact, 
but rituals must also be taken into account. Only twice within his ten books 
does Pausanias state that he personally performed a sacrifi ce. The fi rst oc-
curred on the island of  Aegina, in the sanctuary of  Damia and Auxesia 
where he states that “[he] saw the images and sacrifi ced to them according 
to the ritual observed in sacrifi cing at Eleusis” 43. The second sacrifi ce was 
performed in the Arcadian town of  Phigalia, where the Black Demeter re-
ceived bloodless offerings, also consecrated by the visitor 44. 
Still on a ritual level, many mystery cults related to Demeter and her 
daughter were attested in Arcadia, among which the cult of  Despoina at 
Lycosoura was the most important for all the inhabitants of  the region 45. As 
far as the content of  the mysteries is concerned, we are left in the dark by 
39 Plat. Phaedr. 229–230c.
40 Oliver (1972) 319.
41 Veyne (1983) 109 f. Cf. Hutton (2005) 306 f.
42 E. g. Habicht (²1998) 156–159, esp. 159; Rutherford in: Alcock/Cherry/Elsner 
(2001) 47.
43 Paus. 2.30.4 (transl. J. G. Frazer).
44 Paus. 8.42.14.
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Pausanias, who adopts the silent posture of  an initiate 46. Nevertheless, the 
mythical background of  the cult encompasses some important motives such 
as the story of  Poseidon turning into a male horse in order to mate with 
Demeter who tried to escape him disguised as a mare 47. The goddess was 
honoured as Erinys and Lousa in Telphousa, in memory of  this event, but 
the fact that Despoina was born from this union implies that this tale was 
also part of  the cult of  Lycosoura. Despoina’s father was called Hippios, an 
epiclesis much attested in Arcadia for Poseidon. His sanctuary at Mantineia 
had been reconstructed by the emperor Hadrian, who had prevented some 
workmen from looking into the ruins enclosed inside the new building. The 
entrance of  the old temple built by Trophonius and Agamedes was forbid-
den and merely protected by a woollen thread, which was respected by pious 
people except for one, who died after having cut it 48. This Poseidon is closely 
related to horses, but zoomorphic motives also characterize Demeter herself, 
as well as the punishment Zeus infl icted on Lycaon, turning him into a wolf. 
Furthermore, excavations held on the site of  the sanctuary at Lycosoura 
have brought to light standing terracotta fi gurines with animal heads, and 
the sculpted veil of  Despoina was decorated with characters disguised as 
animals 49. These elements make it possible to suggest that animal motives 
were all the more important during the performance of  the mysteries as 
many local myths were also imbued with such references. 
Piety, close proximity between deities and men, between deities and ani-
mals, primordial sacrifi ces to the Black Demeter, strange rituals in the cult 
of  Zeus Lycaeus, and fi nally Lycosoura, assumed to be the oldest city in the 
world, form a range of  elements to take into account in the assessment of  
the impact of  the local mysteries on the way Pausanias changed his mind. 
The authority of  the Arcadian traditions in matters of  “religious anthropol-
ogy” and their anchorage in the primeval ages of  the world is so powerful 
that even implausible stories with regard to good sense and natural laws 
have to be respected. In this local context, such tales, rooted in performance, 
reclaim a relevance that would be disputed in others.
*
Pausanias’ text is important for the study of  Greek “myth” and “religion”. 
On the one hand, this work offers rich evidence that would have disappeared 
if  its author had not dealt with so many local monuments, peculiarities or ob-
scure traditions. On the other, the visitor provides evidence of  two positions 
46 Paus. 8.25.7; 8.37.9.
47 Paus. 8.25.4–7.
48 Paus. 8.10.2–4.
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regarding this material: he is at the same time an insider who participates in 
the system he describes and an observer who tries to interpret the evidence 
from the outside. The distinction between these positions is often diffi cult 
for us to draw but the Arcadian “conversion” attests that it can shift insofar 
as the fi eld of  experience is still open and alive in the 2nd century AD.
Pausanias was the privileged witness to the present investigation pre-
cisely because of  his ambition to describe “all that was Greece”. Other 
contemporary writers would have been read in this perspective. For instance, 
Arrian offers an interesting remark at the beginning of  the fi fth book of  his 
Anabasis of Alexander, where he refers to the city of  Nysa. The city is said to 
be a foundation of  Dionysus after he had submitted the Indians. But who 
was this Dionysus? When did he live and where did he come from? Arrian 
refuses to address these questions, stating that “this is not necessary to pro-
vide a close examination of  the myths from the remote past regarding the 
divine: what seems to be incredible as far as plausibility is concerned does 
not seem unbelievable at all if  one adduces the divine to the tale” 50. Arrian 
infers that tales related to divine agency cannot be investigated with the 
same methods as the evidence connected with human agency and implies 
therefore a suspension of  judgement. The respective aims of  Pausanias and 
Arrian are not exactly the same, but as far as stories related to deities are 
concerned, standards of  plausibility may be undermined without necessar-
ily undermining credibility. Adopting a received tradition in its own context 
is one of  the best ways of  addressing these narratives. Plutarch’s treaties 
and biographies would also provide a large range of  statements showing 
the necessity, for an insider observer, of  assessing religious feelings and 
adherence to traditional tales according to the context of  the discourse that 
encapsulates them 51. 
Already in Hesiod’s Theogony, plausible fi ction and truth may potentially 
be present in the discourse of  the Muses and truth itself  far away from 
standards of  plausibility. The metaphoric power of  tales related to divine 
agency therefore does not imply their rejection as foolishness without taking 
into account the context of  their enunciation, i. e. the particular authority 
of  the voice that supports them. For Pausanias, this fact became obvious 
in Arcadia. 
50 Arr. an. 5.1.2: πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἀκριβῆ ἐξεταστὴν χρὴ εἶναι τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ θείου 
 ἐκ παλαιοῦ μεμυθευμένων. τὰ γάρ τοι κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ξυντιθέντι οὐ πιστά, ἐπειδὰν 
 τὸ θεῖόν τις προσθῇ τῷ λόγῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἄπιστα φαίνεται. Cf.  Bosworth (1980 ff.) 
vol. 2, 202.
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